I don't think. My orders are I'm not supposed to know where I'm taking this boat, so I don't. But one look at you and I know it's gonna be hot, wherever it is.
Chief Phillips, Apocalypse Now
Evidently Stanley McChrystal has scared the living shit right out of George Will. And why not? Given some of the details of General McChrystal's review/assessment of Afghanistan that are starting to emerge, he should scare the living shit right out of the rest of us, too:
The new commander of international troops in Afghanistan delivered a sweeping review of how the U.S. fights the war today, emphasizing a shift from fighting the Taliban to protecting the population, rooting out corruption, nearly doubling Afghan security forces and transforming how those Afghan forces are trained.
It gets worse:
Though not included in today's assessment, General Stanley McChrystal is soon expected to ask for more troops to fight a resurgent enemy.
And worse:
According to officials familiar with the report, it recommends increasing the target size of Afghan security forces, from a goal of 134,000 Afghan soldiers to 250,000, and increasing the target size of the Afghan police from 92,000 to 160,000.
It also recommends that U.S. and Afghan military command structures be more integrated, meaning U.S. forces would live, eat, and train together. It assesses that the Afghan Army could be in the lead within three years, though officials warn the Afghan police will take much longer.
On the one hand, we have McChrystal (and Holbrooke) telling us the government in Kabul is ineffective and corrupt, and now on the other he's telling us we should give Kabul billions to build a massive professional army and police force. If Afghanistan isn't even a functioning nation-state (no matter how you define the term) - and it isn't - how in the world can you really expect to successfully build and maintain a standing army? Or a police force?
Even more bizarre is the intention to de-emphasize the military's mission of fighting the Taliban. In fact, what McChrystal is now saying to the military is this: "Focus 95 percent of your time building relationships with them [the Afghan people] and, together with the Afghan government, meeting their needs." That leaves a whopping 5% of our military's resources dedicated to the defeat of the Taliban.
If there is one aspect of our mission in Afghanistan that does retain some public support, it is defeating the Taliban on the field of battle. Now, evidently, that is going by the wind. And what we're getting is something we've seen before:
It was called Vietnamization.
Anyone recall how that worked out?
If Barack Obama doesn't fire Stanley McChrystal before the end of the year, you can bet your bottom dollar that by January 2011 we're going to have a war on our hands that will make you yearn for the good old days of George W. in Iraq. Guaranteed.